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After much deliberation and careful thought Neptune Mutual decided to close the cover marketplaces.
After much deliberation and careful thought Neptune Mutual decided to close the cover marketplaces. Below the reasons for the decision as well as what it means for the community.
The marketplaces will be closed using an emergency withdrawal process whereby the liquidity provided to cover pools by LPs will be returned to the wallet addresses from which the liquidity was supplied. In addition to protecting cover pool LPs, there will also be refunds to all cover policy purchasers with an existing and valid policy who have paid over 10 USD in policy fees in one transaction.
For veNPM holders, please fill out this form to receive a refund for your veNPM to NPM conversion penalty.
From the end of June there will no longer be NPM emission incentives for LPs i.e. Epoch 3 of the liquidity gauge emissions will be canceled.
Unused funds raised from financial backers will be returned to those backers; this includes DEX liquidity that has now been removed from SushiSwap and Uniswap. A small amount of liquidity on SushiSwap Arbitrum has been left to enable a minimum amount of NPM trading.
The protocol will be open sourced, and become a true public good. Enabling the community to fork the code developed by the Neptune Mutual team such that others might use the existing resources to further our mission to make the blockchain space better protected against smart contracts and other risks.
There are numerous factors that have led to this difficult decision, some of which are external factors which are uncontrollable or unforeseeable. A few factors summarized below:
“Given Neptune Mutual’s Tier 1 backers, why have you not listed on a top CEX?”
This is perhaps one of the most frequently asked questions. In short, the answer is that for a variety of reasons Neptune Mutual was not able to achieve the diverse set of performance metrics (community size and engagement, marketplace user activity, DEX 24 hour trading volume, TVL growth etc.) required to list on top tier CEX. The CEXs that are prepared to list NPM token do not have the depth of liquidity or breadth of user-base to offer good prospects for NPM tokenholders.
The above point invariably leads to the question
“Why has Neptune Mutual not achieved strong growth?”
It is tempting to take a shortcut to answer this question by pointing a finger at one specific factor, but the reality is that there are many contributing factors. A few summarized below:
Since the outset of engaging with the community we have endeavored to highlight the need for DeFiInsurance; Neptune Mutual built a comprehensive dataset of on-chain hacks available, anywhere, and each week we highlight the many millions of dollars that are stolen as a result of smart contract hacks. Despite this, we have consistently been confronted by projects unwilling to spin up cover pools in our marketplace because of the sentiment that audits of their code are sufficient to persuade their community that their protocol is safe. Less than 0.3% of all digital assets are protected with some form of DeFiInsurance, and yet despite all the media reports of hacks, the conference discussions about the importance of governance or CEX proof-of-reserves, it continues to be the case that it is extremely difficult to get media attention to focus on the need for a fast and efficient means of mitigating smart contract risk.
A variety of approaches have been taken by different DeFiInsurance protocols to address this, from attending multiple conferences throughout the year and significant marketing spend, to the leaner approach that Neptune Mutual took (in part as a result of the bear market in 2023). What can be said is that no DeFiInsurance protocol has managed to achieve significant growth over the last 18 months, sadly the overall TVL of the sector has shrunk a lot.
For all the reasons above, at this moment the best course of action is no longer to double-down on investing in growth, but rather to refund unused capital and close the marketplaces.
The consequences are very tough for the Neptune Mutual team who have spent the past 3 years of their time on the mission to facilitate safer environments within DeFi. The team has delivered products according to the roadmap and the fact that the protocol was never hacked, despite attempts being made on the darkweb, is testament to the expertise, passion and absolute focus on security. The team survived the FTX and UST crisis unscathed, and believed that the continued growth in hacks would lead to growth in the demand for a good solution to mitigate these risks, but sadly, as can be seen right across the DeFiInsurance category, this is not yet in sight. So we would like to thank the team for all the dedication, skill and passion invested into the Neptune Mutual project since the outset.
The team will open source the protocol, including blockchain indexing protocol (subgraph alternative), frontend, middleware, database, and backend code, to make it a true public good. This will allow anyone to fork the code and create covers by defining parameters and premium ranges, potentially leading to innovative covers and organic usage.
The Discord channel will be closed to reduce the risk of phishing and other types of cyber attack, any questions / queries will be responded to in the Telegram channel.
We want to take this final opportunity to thank you all for your support.
Neptune Mutual will contact only its financial backers, with whom a signed agreement exists, in relation to next steps (i.e. holding NPM tokens does not qualify you for any form of refund). Contact will be made only from a neptunemutual.com domain email address so please check the source of any email you may receive very carefully. Please ignore any messages from any other email or social media accounts in relation to token/cash refunds.
Learn about the workings, types, impacts, and nuances of MEV in the blockchain ecosystem.
Maximal Extractable Value or MEV represents the maximum value that blockchain miners or validators can derive by altering transaction orders during the process of block creation. Initially termed Miner Extractable Value, MEV's name evolved to its current form to better capture its relevance across various blockchain models, including proof-of-work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS) systems.
MEV arises when blockchain actors, such as miners or validators, resequence transactions within a block to their advantage, often at the expense of regular users. These actors possess the authority to determine the order in which transactions are processed on the blockchain. This power, however, can be leveraged for personal financial gain, creating potential ethical and fairness concerns within the blockchain ecosystem.
The Ethereum blockchain is well-known for its highly competitive and adversarial nature. Vulnerable smart contracts within this environment are prime targets for financial exploitation. The growing number of hacks and exploits underscores the intense examination and scrutiny these contracts face from individuals adept at identifying and leveraging weaknesses.
Yet, the intricacies of the mempool eclipse even the challenges of the blockchain. Serving as a repository for pending, unconfirmed transactions, the mempool is an essential but complex component of the blockchain system. If the blockchain is a battleground, the mempool is akin to a much more intimidating and obscure environment—a "dark forest."
In this dark forest of the Ethereum mempool, the most formidable predators are arbitrage bots. These bots relentlessly scan the pending transactions, seeking opportunities to profit. Ari Juels and Lorenz Breidenbach of Chainlink Labs' 2019 research paper, Flash Boys 2.0, goes in-depth on this subject. Their study not only sheds light on Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) and transaction reordering but also emphasizes the significant effects these practices have, such as transaction frontrunning on decentralized exchanges. Remarkably, it's reported that the total MEV extracted on the Ethereum Mainnet before the merge reached a staggering $675,623,114.
Arbitrage bots in the mempool typically focus on certain types of transactions to frontrun, employing complex algorithms to do so. Generalized frontrunners look for any transaction that presents a profitable opportunity, replicating it with their own addresses and executing it. This approach allows them to clone and gain from profitable internal transactions that arise from the transaction's execution trace.
In blockchain networks like Ethereum, an immutable ledger is maintained by a decentralized network of computers or nodes, commonly referred to as block producers. These include miners in Proof of Work (PoW) systems and validators in Proof of Stake (PoS) networks. Their fundamental task involves collecting pending transactions and assembling them into blocks, which are then validated and added to the global ledger. While these networks authenticate all transactions and ensure uninterrupted block production, they do not inherently secure the chronological order of transactions as they are submitted to the blockchain.
Given that each block has a limited capacity for transactions, block producers have the autonomy to choose which transactions from the mempool to include in their block. They typically prioritize transactions offering higher gas prices or transaction fees, as this maximizes their revenue. However, this is a preferential practice rather than a network-enforced rule. As a result, block producers have the liberty to rearrange transactions at their discretion, giving rise to the concept of maximal extractable value.
Contrary to sequencing transactions based on their submission times, block producers usually organize them according to the fees they carry.
Due to the specialized knowledge and expertise required to exploit MEV effectively, many block producers in blockchain networks outsource block construction to third-party entities. This group consists of searchers, builders, and relayers. Searchers scout for MEV opportunities and create bundles of multiple transactions, often incorporating other users' transactions. Builders then take these bundles and construct complete block payloads. Finally, relayers, serving as intermediaries, present these full blocks to the blockchain's block producers. It's crucial to recognize that this is just one of several methods currently employed by block producers to extract MEV, with the ecosystem constantly evolving.
Regrettably, MEV extraction typically occurs at the expense of regular users, often in subtle ways that may not become apparent until after the transaction has been processed. This can lead to users experiencing less favorable trade outcomes, with MEV being directly extracted from their transactions.
Compiling a comprehensive list of MEV extraction methods is challenging due to the evolving nature of the phenomenon and the tendency of searchers to conceal their strategies. However, there are several well-known examples of MEV that can be highlighted.
A sophisticated approach to MEV extraction is generalized frontrunning. In this method, a bot monitors the mempool, submits a duplicate transaction with a higher fee, and replaces the original user's address in the transaction payload with its own. This strategy proved to be particularly effective in a scenario where a generalized frontrunner intercepted and replaced a crucial transaction, thwarting a white-hat hacker's efforts to safeguard vulnerable user funds. These bots don’t analyze the purpose of the transaction; they employ algorithms to modify transactions in the mempool and simulate their execution to identify potential profits.
A direct form of MEV that impacts user experience involves bots executing frontrunning on decentralized exchanges (DEXs). These bots can detect large trades in the publicly visible mempool and act on them.
For example, upon spotting a significant trade, a bot can create a transaction bundle that executes its trade before the user’s transaction. This alters the asset's market price, causing more significant slippage for the user, i.e., a discrepancy between expected and actual trade prices.
After the user's trade executes, causing a further shift in the market price, the frontrunner sells their assets in a backrun trade, completing a sandwich attack. As a result, users experience suboptimal exchange rates, incurring hidden costs on DEXs by receiving fewer tokens than anticipated.
MEV also manifests in bots exploiting price disparities between different DEXs. This arbitrage opportunity emerges when an asset's price on one exchange deviates from another, often due to substantial trades. Bots take advantage of this by buying assets on the lower-priced exchange and selling them on the higher-priced one, effectively equalizing prices and securing profits. This type of arbitrage extends to interactions between on-chain DEXs and off-chain centralized exchanges, as well as across different blockchain networks.
The expansion of decentralized finance and DEX liquidity has increased the frequency and profitability of these arbitrage opportunities, leading to intense competition among bots. These bots engage in bidding wars, continuously raising the fees they offer to block producers to ensure the prioritization of their transaction bundles.
While arbitrage is a common market activity, MEV bots amplify this by monitoring the mempool, replicating trades, and offering higher fees to ensure their transactions are processed first.
MEV contributes to mitigating economic inefficiencies within DeFi protocols. A key example of this is the use of MEV to facilitate rapid liquidations, which are crucial in ensuring that lenders are reimbursed when borrowers' collateralization ratios fall below required thresholds.
Additionally, arbitrage traders who utilize MEV contribute to the alignment of token prices across various decentralized exchanges, reflecting broader market demands. By harnessing MEV for profit maximization, these economically motivated actors can aid in diminishing the inefficiencies of individual protocols, thereby improving the overall efficiency and resilience of the DeFi ecosystem.
Proponents of MEV also argue that it enhances blockchain network security. This is achieved by incentivizing miners or validators to actively participate in the competition for block production, which in turn strengthens the network's overall security and stability.
The adoption of MEV in blockchain networks can have negative implications, particularly impacting the end-user experience. One of the most noticeable effects is seen in scenarios like sandwich attacks on decentralized exchanges. These attacks often lead to substantial slippage during trade executions, creating unfavorable trading conditions for users and potentially eroding trust in the platform.
Another issue stemming from MEV is the increased network congestion caused by generalized frontrunners. These actors often pay higher gas fees to ensure their transactions are prioritized, which can lead to an overall increase in transaction costs for all network participants. This not only raises the cost of participation in the network but can also slow down transaction processing times, affecting the network's efficiency.
A more critical concern is the potential destabilization of the blockchain's consensus mechanism. This can occur when the MEV available to block producers exceeds the block reward. Under these circumstances, block producers might be tempted to reorganize previously confirmed blocks to capture MEV opportunities. Such practices threaten the blockchain's integrity and reliability, as they could lead to double-spending issues and reduce confidence in the network's immutability.